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Foreword
Why Measurement of Costs and Beneﬁts Matters
for the SDG Campaign

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provide an extraordinary vision of what global development should look like between now and 2030.
Starting with the concept of sustainability, the
SDGs go far beyond the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to incorporate a set of
environmental and social-justice priorities that
require national action at all levels of income.
As agreed by 193 signatory nations at the September 2015 United Nations General Assembly,
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
(https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/
transformingourworld) is meant to be universal,
indivisible, and interlinked. In conventional
development arenas like extreme poverty and
hunger the SDGs also inspire, doubling down on
the MDGs by deﬁning success in absolute rather
than relative terms. Global partners target an end
to poverty in all its forms, for example, rather than
a 50 percent reduction in extreme-poverty headcount ratios.
The UN’s drive for universal norms and targets
involved widespread public debate and painstaking
negotiations and compromises between national
governments. The process was simultaneously
more transparent and much more difﬁcult and
convoluted than when the MDGs emerged from
behind closed doors a decade and a half ago. Some
widening in the scope of commitments was inevitable and also desirable, to accommodate sustainability goals and build a truly global coalition. But
there was also widespread awareness as negotiations proceeded that fewer goals might allow
for greater success. By the latter standard, the
2030 Agenda is daunting. With 17 global goals
and 169 highly ambitious targets, the Agenda
seems in danger of departing not just in scope but
also in coherence from the elegant eight goals and
17 targets of the MDGs.

In practice, therefore, a great deal remains on the
table in terms of shaping global action. This is true
not just in the conventional sense of identifying costeffective approaches to individual targets but also in
the deeper sense of operationalizing – and unavoidably, prioritizing – targets at the national and global
levels. This book makes a vital contribution to what
should be a collective effort to prioritize.
Cost-beneﬁt analysis (CBA) is a wellestablished method for prioritizing spending in
a world of limited budgets, not least in some
of the poorest settings of the world. When done
carefully, CBA and its cousin, cost-effectiveness
analysis (which evaluates alternative approaches
to achieving a given result), provide a transparent
and evidence-based approach to identifying costeffective uses of public money. Working together
with ex-post evaluation and careful monitoring
during program delivery, CBA can increase both
the quality and the quantity of public spending, by
shifting funds toward high-value projects and
convincing funders (ultimately, taxpayers) that
they are getting value for their money.
The Copenhagen Consensus should be
applauded for its campaign to bring rigorous
CBA evidence to bear in public debates on the
scope of the SDGs. The papers collected here
informed a comprehensive scorecard that covered
the majority of the proposed targets and was available during the ﬁnal year of negotiations. The
analysis suggested what was at stake: assuming
best-practice interventions, a failure to prioritize
across goals could reduce a comprehensive measure of total beneﬁts by 75 percent or more per
dollar of costs. Losses of similar magnitude could
accompany the pursuit of overambitious target
levels or suboptimal interventions.
To date, this analysis has had less traction than
the Copenhagen Consensus hoped, a result familiar
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to any practitioner of cost-beneﬁt analysis within
governments and development agencies. The hope
that the analysis would guide a winnowing of the
goals did not materialize. But these studies remain
crucial, as inputs into the debates that will now be
required to operationalize the SDGs.
We focus on two questions in this foreword.
First, why prioritize? We will discuss what the
MDGs accomplished and how these lessons should
inform the SDG process looking forward. Second,
how should development actors – governments,
development agencies, and nongovernmental and
civil-society organizations – use the cost-beneﬁt
evidence collected here?
We should be candid at the outset on two
matters. First, neither of us is convinced that topdown goal setting within international organizations represents the best route to development success. Development efforts require local and
national political buy-in to be successful. Achieving growth and development in a society is complicated, messy, and context-speciﬁc and is about
more than allocating resources. Outside of narrow
corridors within which best practices are known
and the links between inputs and outcomes are
tight (as with some public health and humanitarian
interventions), the allure of “buying” development – reducing development to spending a particular sum of money – is an illusion. Second, costbeneﬁt analysis has its own methodological limitations. Almost by deﬁnition, the clarity of a beneﬁtto-cost ratio is greater than what the data and
modeling apparatus can support. Used uncritically,
the method can support overconﬁdent rankings
between outcomes that are not easily compared
and invite generalization across contexts that differ
in unmeasured ways. Despite these observations,
however, we strongly believe that cost-beneﬁt
exercises as conducted in this book should get
more attention and should be used in debates on
the allocation of resources across the world.

From MDGs to SDGs
The SDG process was spurred on by global
successes during the MDG period, including a
spectacular outcome for the extreme-poverty
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headcount ratio that was conﬁdently predictable
well before the SDG consultations began in earnest. The argument for doubling down, however,
rested on a claim that observed outcomes were
the result of the MDGs, implying that they would
not have occurred without the goals, targets, and
institution building of the campaign. That claim
remains controversial, for the simple reason that
the counterfactual – the outcome that would have
emerged without the MDGs – is not observable.
Still, a few facts stand out that may well be attributable to some extent to the presence of the MDGs.
The global aid envelope expanded dramatically
in the period since the MDGs were agreed, from
US$80bn in 2000 to US$147bn in 2015 and after a
period of stagnation in aid volumes during the
1990s. The clarity of the narrative around the
MDGs may have helped to revive political interest
in aid, amid fairly widespread disillusion among
rich countries in the 1990s. The chosen goals were
modest in number, and they were sufﬁciently noncontroversial to mitigate conﬂicts of interest
between donors and recipients. Their collective
adoption was consistent with ongoing efforts to
enhance donor coordination and avoid costly
duplication of activity. Numerical targets were a
key innovation of the MDG campaign: they promised an increase in two-way accountability, underpinned by credible and transparent mechanisms to
monitor progress.
The discourse of what gets measured gets done
acquired impetus late in the MDG campaign,
reﬂecting a growing perception that the adoption
of numerical targets did succeed in increasing
accountability throughout the development cooperation system. By this argument, sending countries
acquired leverage for holding recipients to account
in the use of their funding, while recipient countries and other stakeholders were able to assess the
alignment of donor portfolios – the countries and
programs donors were willing to fund – with MDG
priorities. Both sides plausibly faced new costs of
reneging on MDG-related commitments, as no
stakeholder could publicly repudiate a target like
cutting poverty in half.
The Department for International Development (DFID) and the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) both made
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major efforts to bolster accountability during the
2000s, tied in some cases directly to MDG targets.
USAID’s Feed the Future program, for example,
adopted the headcount ratio as a program target
within its zones of inﬂuence, while DFID increasingly concentrated its spending in countries
failing in income poverty reduction and the other
MDGs. Late in the process both the World Bank
(2013) and USAID (2014) appropriated extremepoverty targets directly into their mission statements. The World Bank and UN system invested
heavily from the outset in publicly available data
and monitoring around the MDGs, an activity that
undoubtedly spurred new research and may have
facilitated watchdog innovations, including the
Center for Global Development’s aid-quality
measures.
Formal attempts to construct a convincing
counterfactual will continue. To date, the research
has been limited to controlling for preexisting
trajectories by looking for improvements in indicator trends among aid-receiving countries around
the time the MDGs were adopted. Timing may
of course be a weak proxy for the intensity of
treatment, given that countries differed sharply in
their exposure to MDG-related aid ﬂows and that
donor priorities had already moved decidedly
in favor of poverty-reduction goals during the
Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative of
the late 1990s. These concerns notwithstanding,
the research to date suggests a decidedly mixed
picture: some indicators are consistent with a new
departure around 2000, and others are not (see, for
example, World Bank, Global Monitoring Report
(GMR) 2016/2016). They also carry a sobering
message looking forward because if preexisting
trends represent a legitimate counterfactual, then
the successes of the MDGs have made the
remaining task considerably more difﬁcult. The
countries with the biggest indicator deﬁcits in
2015 are, in many cases, those with the most
adverse indicator trends over the past decade.
This is in sharp contrast with China and India,
which had the largest poverty deﬁcits in
2000 but were already achieving spectacularly
favorable (China) or at least modestly favorable
(India) indicator trends before 2000. China, of
course, received almost no development assistance

after 2000, and India received very little on a per
capita basis.
Our own view is that whatever else the MDGs
achieved, the campaign revitalized global development efforts by expanding aid ﬂows and increasing
accountability and coordination among donors.
The troubling question is whether the sprawling
scope of the SDGs puts these achievements at risk,
especially against the headwinds of slower global
growth. An agenda that is too broad to galvanize
focused action may fail to sustain overall aid ﬂows,
misdirect such ﬂows as are available, and risk
returning the development community to a lowaccountability mode of business as usual.
The SDG agreement shows clear if indirect
awareness of this concern, pushing back vigorously with its characterization of the goals as universal, indivisible, and interlinked. From this
perspective, the SDGs are less a set of competing
goals than a comprehensive checklist for achieving
the one great objective of ending global poverty on
a sustainable basis. This interpretation is broadly
consistent with the World Bank’s interpretation of
its own extreme-poverty mission (see World Bank,
GMR 2015/2016, referenced earlier), and with
USAID’s Vision for Ending Extreme Poverty.
These interpretations give targets for the extremepoverty headcount ratio pride of place, but they
deﬁne poverty as a multidimensional and contextualized phenomenon and lay out a theory of
change that is broad enough to validate a very wide
list of complementary targets.
But this returns us to prioritization. A central
contribution of the MDG campaign was to elevate
a plausibly universal concept of development
itself – not as economic growth or progress, as
crucial as those might be on instrumental grounds,
but as elimination of human deprivation. The
SDGs double down here as well, by incorporating
sustainability and an insistence on leaving nobody
behind. But characterizing a set of 169 targets as
indivisible and interlinked comes close to repudiating any attempt to prioritize or assign responsibility. Accountability may lose its foothold if most
forms of development spending can be validated
in terms of their direct objectives while weak
impacts can be explained away through appeals
to inadequate efforts by other actors or failures
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elsewhere in the system. And even where lines of
responsibility are clear – as in the data-collection
arena where the public-good aspect demands
public provision – the magnitude of the task overwhelms available resources. In short, the leverage
implied by what gets measured gets done strains
credulity when stretched so far. We cannot credibly claim that whatever gets measured gets done.
Finally, we worry that a proliferation of targets
may run afoul of some well-deﬁned perils of scale.
Numerical targets risk extending a gap-ﬁlling
mentality beyond its appropriate domain. They
perpetuate the impression that development outcomes can be purchased at a unit cost that is
invariant across countries. They can enforce overuniformity, favoring large-scale commitments that
may stiﬂe experimentation and fail to exploit
individual-country or individual-donor opportunities. If these concerns vary in systematic ways
across goals, the implication is that some goals
lend themselves more readily to such targets
than others.

How Should Development Stakeholders
Use These CBAs?
The need for prioritization is clear in our view, and
therefore the drive for sensible criteria to inform
global debates. The chapters collected here provide
beneﬁt-to-cost ratios for a wide range of targets,
assuming best-practice interventions. To interpret
these ratios, consider an intervention that incurs an
up-front cost of c to deliver a perpetual stream of
beneﬁts equal to b dollars each year (adjusted for
inﬂation). Suppose that future costs and beneﬁts
are discounted at rate r > 0; the studies collected
here compare 3 and 5 percent (r = 0.03 and r =
0.05). Then the ratio of discounted beneﬁts to
discounted costs – or beneﬁt-to-cost ratio – for this
intervention is given by BCR = (1/r)*(b/c). This
calculation illustrates the standard result that
higher discount rates (embodying greater societal
impatience) discourage interventions whose beneﬁts are deferred relative to costs. At bottom, however, the intervention caricatured here provides
discounted beneﬁts of BCR dollars for every discounted dollar of cost. If a private ﬁrm could
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recoup its costs by collecting a revenue stream
equal to b each year, any intervention with a
BCR exceeding one would be privately proﬁtable.
But in a social cost-beneﬁt analysis the costs and
beneﬁts include environmental and third-party
impacts that are not priced in markets, along with
indirect impacts that may include synergies with
other targets. Interventions that are socially proﬁtable by a BCR criterion – even hugely so – typically require public intervention precisely because
they are not privately proﬁtable.
The difference between a target’s BCR and 1,
multiplied by the scale of the intervention, summarizes what happens to the total economic pie,
including the valuation of goods and services that
are not priced in markets, as a result of achieving
the target (we emphasize scale effects later). The
calculation is meant to be comprehensive, including all direct and indirect impacts. A BCR above
1 therefore means that the overall pie is bigger, and
by a larger amount per dollar of cost the bigger is
the BCR. In the absence of distributional weights
(see later), an intervention with a BCR above
1 delivers enough dollar-equivalent gains per
dollar of cost that nobody has to lose, at least in
the hypothetical sense that a set of costless side
payments would make it possible to fully compensate any losers while leaving at least one person
better off.
Three key features shape these chapters and the
resulting rankings sufﬁciently to warrant some
general observations for nonspecialist readers.
The ﬁrst is the curse of diminishing returns. At
the level of ambition embodied by the SDGs, a
number of global targets (including those for
global average temperature, primary and secondary
enrollment, and maternal mortality) are subject
to sharply increasing marginal costs. The cost
of reducing projected global temperatures by
2 degrees over a given horizon, for example, is
much more than twice the cost of reducing projected temperatures by 1 degree. In the presence of
rising marginal costs, the best becomes the enemy
of the good, and CBA has a natural tendency
to produce moderation. BCRs that are high
at modest target levels start to fall as targets
become more inspiring, and can go well below 1.
The extreme-poverty headcount ratio falls to this
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argument – getting to zero is too costly. This effect
is even stronger if beneﬁts are declining on the
margin, but the curse discourages extreme targets
even when goals are viewed as intrinsic rights that
must ultimately be satisﬁed in full as rapidly as
feasible.
In a world of diminishing returns, smaller interventions will tend (other things equal) to produce
larger BCRs. The optimal set of interventions over
any ﬁxed overall budget and time horizon will
therefore tend to involve the partial fulﬁllment of
multiple targets. The argument for focusing on a
few big efforts has to come from somewhere else –
in short, either from a prioritization of rights that
classiﬁes selected targets as nonnegotiable, or from
some form of increasing returns to individual
targets. Our arguments about accountability fall
into the latter category. They embody a form of
increasing returns, where the cost of effective
action includes a large ﬁxed component that may
involve data provision, coalition- and institutionbuilding, or development of target-speciﬁc supply
chains. These costs are implicit in the book, in the
sense that all of the chapters take ambitious goals
and large-scale efforts as a starting point. Other
sources of increasing returns, including network
effects (e.g., in stopping epidemics) and irreversibilities (e.g., in environmental preservation), play
an important role in some of the relevant chapters.
But the curse of decreasing returns inevitably
pushes a number of authors to embrace more moderate target levels than the SDGs propose.
The second feature relates to the valuation of
beneﬁts. Within development agencies and governments, it is often sufﬁcient to treat in-kind targets as
given and focus on the search for cost-effective
interventions. The chapters collected here perform
a similar (and invaluable) task on the cost side – a
task that is heroic enough on its own, given the
unavoidable distortions of having to assume, ﬁrst,
that interventions at a given global scale encounter
the same unit costs everywhere in the world and,
second, that these costs can be reasonably estimated
using one or two well-designed impact assessments
from particular times and places.
But authors were also asked to place dollarequivalent values on all beneﬁts, so that users
could compare global temperature targets with

completion of the Doha round and coral reef preservation with reductions in maternal mortality.
Although expressing all beneﬁts in dollarequivalent values remains controversial, the appeal
of this approach is obvious: if the analysis is even
reasonably robust, it is hard to argue that projects
with phenomenal BCRs (to use the Copenhagen
Consensus’s term for BCRs of 15 or above) should
not receive priority relative to those with BCRs
below 1. But the chapters vary widely in the comprehensiveness and robustness of their beneﬁt estimates. Calculations of the social return to
schooling, for example, are often famously modest
in the sense of including only the social costs of
schooling and none of the spillover beneﬁts that a
vast and admittedly contentious literature has
emphasized over the years – spillovers that range
from lower fertility to higher civic engagement and
from improvements in institutional quality to
women’s empowerment and economy-wide innovation. Our own view is that these spillovers are of
the essence. But Chapter 6 by Psacharopoulos is in
this modest tradition – no spillover beneﬁts, no
synergies with other SDGs.
There may, in fact, be a general case for staying
modest, given how contentious the assessment of
these effects can be. And one does not need spillovers, for example, to favor a shift toward earlyage interventions in education and health, given
the increasing evidence of lifelong impacts on
productivity and well-being. But the main point is
caveat emptor: some chapters are braver (or more
foolhardy) in this respect, and a more uniform
treatment of beneﬁts might substantially alter the
rankings. The lesson is a general one when comparing CBAs across disparate sectors: users need
to be attentive not only to how beneﬁts are valued
but also to what beneﬁts are included.
The ﬁnal feature relates to distributional objectives, which are central to the MDG and SDG
campaigns but curiously absent in the cost-beneﬁt
calculation we described earlier. A thought experiment brings out the issue. Suppose for a moment
that costless transfers were indeed possible and that
the most cost-effective way to end extreme poverty
was simply to guarantee each person on earth
$1.90 a day. This would be done through targeted
transfers to make up any difference relative to each

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Libraries, on 09 Sep 2019 at 20:29:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233767.001

Foreword

person’s market-related outcome. What BCR
would this intervention generate? The answer is
that unless the intervention altered the behavior
of the household in some fundamentally favorable
way – rather than just scaling up its consumption –
the BCR could not exceed 1. The program beneﬁt
would be the discounted global consumption shortfall of the poor in the presence of the program –
call this S – and the cost would be S as well. Any
realistic accounting for administrative costs would
in fact drive the BCR below 1.
Any outright efﬁciency gains from poverty
reduction would help to push the BCR above 1.
But some form of distributional weighting is arguably central to justifying any global poverty target.
In the welfarist tradition within economics, this is
done by making the social utility of an incomeequivalent beneﬁt depend on the household’s
income. A dollar of purchasing power is viewed
as being worth more in the hands of a poor household than in the hands of a rich household.
A rights-based approach has a similar feel: if
$1.90 is an absolute right, then only another right
can be in tension with it, not a cost that may
happen to exceed $1.90.
Distributional concerns are handled in subtle
ways in these chapters and readers should be prepared to query the individual chapters. In Chapter 24, on poverty, Gibson uses a modiﬁed version
of S to measure costs. He assesses beneﬁts, however, based on microeconomic evidence on the
difference in lifetime earnings between individuals
who grew up above and below the poverty line.
This raises the BCR above 1, under the implicit
assumption that some plausible combination of
credit-market and information imperfections prevents the poor from borrowing to secure these
efﬁciency gains themselves. But a simple
distributional-weighting scheme could easily have
raised the BCR of higher. Using log utility, for
example, the value of transferring a dollar from a
rich household to a poor household is not 1 but
yRich / yPoor. Logarithmic weights would therefore
immediately translate an ambitious consumptionpoverty target like 3 percent into phenomenal
range because of its highly targeted beneﬁciary
population (by implication, of course, the overall
size of the pie is no longer the optimality criterion).
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An implicit form of distributional weighting is
embedded in some of these chapters, as when
researchers apply an economy-wide value for
disability-adjusted life years in evaluating health
interventions that disproportionately favor poor
communities. In these cases, as with distributional
weights, the analyst places greater value on the
well-being of the poor than their own willingness
to pay would be able to reveal.
With these observations in mind, these chapters
and the resulting rankings deserve a broad readership among development stakeholders and will
raise the equality of public debates on priorities.
There are challenges and debates here for
researchers as well. How far can a CBA platform
take us in comparing health interventions with
education interventions, let alone in accommodating improvements in accountability or sustainability? Can increasing returns and distributional
impacts be handled more systematically? Is there
external validity in the cost and beneﬁt data, so that
BCRs based on exemplary microeconomic evidence from individual countries can be appropriated for global calculations? Or do we actually
have enough data to disaggregate in some cases –
for example, to settle the costs of delivering a
nutrition program in South Sudan, versus in Peru
or India, all places with considerable stunting?
How about synergies and general-equilibrium
impacts; in some cases these are intrinsic to the
calculation, as in the case of trade-policy reforms,
while in others they are brought in selectively, as in
the case of family-planning interventions that generate positive externalities through slower population growth. In still other cases they are excluded
as too speculative. How important are these differences, and are there ways to formally incorporate
successively more speculative elements of the
analysis? Finally, how should the empirical
methods employed to estimate treatment effects
affect the interpretation of results? Should estimates based largely on randomized controlled
trials, for example, be viewed as inherently conservative, while those that rely mainly on crosscountry empirics or simulation modeling are
viewed as decidedly less so?
Caveats are easy – too easy, because those who
ﬁnd these calculations uncomfortable will want to
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dismiss them. We ourselves would not recommend
spending the global development budget, or even
the portion allocated by foreign aid agencies,
simply based on the beneﬁt-cost ratios in this book.
But the contributions here are nonetheless invaluable. By providing a rigorous examination of the
cost and beneﬁt evidence, they are a crucial buttress to the morally urgent work ahead. They ask
an unavoidable question: when resources to
improve the lives of the poor are scarce, how can
we get these resources to go further – much further? The question is difﬁcult, but cost-beneﬁt
analysis provides a set of answers that are transparent and evidence based. Their transparency favors
debate and can serve as a check on those with the
power to allocate resources. Good answers, in turn,
will call forth more resources, by empowering the
supporters of projects that contribute substantially

to the overall public interest. There is a vast
ongoing expansion of data, micro, and macroevidence that can be used to calibrate this analysis and
improve it over time.
So we should see this work as a ﬁrst step and
invite those that care about how efﬁciently global
resources are spent in development to reﬂect on this
evidence. We should work to improve the global
evidence base and replicate it in different settings,
acknowledging that context will matter both for
beneﬁts and for costs. And while being impatient
for further evidence, we should ﬁrst and foremost
insist on using what is in front of us. We should use
this analysis to ask hard questions of those who
would propose to spend resources at odds with the
best available evidence on likely costs and beneﬁts.
Stefan Dercon and Stephen A. O’Connell
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